Since the 1980's, globalisation has become the theme of politics. Whether used by business analysts or social theorists, the term 'globalisation' has been associated with an expectation of a new era. In the opinion of the business analysts, this era is constituted by global free-flows of capitalist market economy producing ever more options and welfare; whereas social theorists would rather speak of reorganisation of ethical horizon and socio-political space and time. In both cases, the presumption is that state sovereignty will fade away into the background.
Some critics of globalisation have pointed out that the "neomediavalism" resulting from regionalisation and globalisation might not turn out to be any better than the darkest modern sketches of the European Middle Ages. Perhaps the future will be full of chaotic episodes, deepening inequalities, ecological catastrophes and ubiquitous violence -with little or no democracy left in the world? However, an ability to envisage these problems and tendencies seems to lead to social criticism only rarely. Even many of those apparently despairing of the negative tendencies related to current globalisation have preached determinism in the name of positive sociology: we should describe and understand, but not condemn or search for alternatives. As Manuel Castells (1996: 477-478) declares in his characteristically deterministic, yet ambivalent manner, the outcome of a society organised "around the * This paper is also forthcoming in Indonesian in Wacana, later in 2000. It is an attempt to reflect more systematically on the wider themes of the Report by the Network Institute for Global Democratisation, NIGD, entitled The Tobin Tax: How to Make it Real. Towards a Socially Responsible an Democratic System of Global Governance (Patomäki 1999a ; a substantially amended and enlarged version is forthcoming as Democratising Globalization. The Leverage of the Tobin Tax, by Zed Books, London, 2000 ) . The Report, in turn, originated in the series of financial crises that started from Thailand and some other East Asian countries in 1997; the series of interconnected crises has given impetus to political campaigns for the Tobin tax in different parts of the world. The NIGD Report has grounded an on-going political campaign in and via Finland, and is intimately connected to the network of organisations and activities initiated from Paris/Le Monde Diplomatique, called ATTAC (Association pour une Taxe sur les Transactions financières pour l'Aide aux Citoyens); to the Halifax Initiative (Coalition for Global Economic Democracy) based in Canada; and to the activities of the War on Want, a British NGO fighting global poverty and also campaigning for the Tobin Tax.
space of flows and timeless time" will be the information age, which we may not like, but have to accept: Not everybody believes, however, that there is no "real economy" anymore, in particular in contrast to largely speculative global financial markets; or that the space of flows is irresistible and non-transformable; or that time has become "timeless". It is more promising to declare that "history is just beginning". However, "the construction of social action and politics around primary identities" (ibid.: 22) has not been the only remaining force left outside the networks of power, money and information. There are, for instance, many attempts at reterritorializing and renationalising the political struggles of the globalising world.
The sovereign state continues to be conceived as the force capable of resisting globalising neoliberalism. In the eyes of spiritualists, nationalists, social-democrats and socialists of all kinds, the contemporary globalisation seems to combine the overpowering and unprecedented hegemony of the US and the Washington consensus with the classical effects of laissez faire capitalism writ large: homogenising westernisation, social and cultural destruction, global exploitation and darwinism. And we have been warned that the periods approximating total liberalism have always been brief (e.g. Amin 1998: 98-99) .
In the West the political situation may appear to be, once again, close to an "end of ideology". This may give rise to a myopia that leads to the potential for repeating past mistakes. It is even possible that the liberal utopia will be, once again, ended by power-political and violent means. Perhaps a new anti-Western coalition of states will rise, following domestic situations that have become unbearable in the light of old/new radical ideas, based also on identification of the enemies of nation, culture or civilisation (the West, the US, the casino capitalists, the neoliberalist, the marionets of Washington etc.)? Perhaps many pariah states of the late 1990's would be happy to join this coalition? Perhaps they would be also assisted by some non-territorial, radical actors opposing the neoliberalist, US dominated status quo? (Cf. Carr 1964 /1946 Patomäki & Waever 1995, 11-19; Patomäki 1999b, 135) But there are also other possible futures. Concrete initiatives such as the Tobin tax seems to promise a new phase in the politics of globalisation. The Tobin tax is a low rate tax on financial transactions of all currencies in whatever form. The shorter the time horizon of the investments, the stronger the impact of the tax. The Tobin tax is addressed particularly against the power of speculative financial markets, in the name of the real economy consequences of this "too well working" space of financial flows (the favourite phrase of James Tobin, 1978 , is "throwing sand in the wheels of the financial markets").
The currency transactions tax would defend and develop the autonomy of states, in particular the room of manoeuvre of their economic policies. However, whereas a Tobin tax regime can be seen as defending some aspects of state sovereignty, it also opens up new, pathbreaking global ethico-political problems of governance. Suddenly, politics of globalisation seems to be also about authority, democracy, social responsibility and justice.
What is the Tobin tax?
Tobin proposed a low rate tax on financial transactions of currencies in the 1970's, in the wake of the partial collapse of the original Bretton Woods system (originally the proposal was made in Tobin 1974; but more thoroughly in Tobin 1978) . He argued that the real problem is the volatility of these markets, and it can be curbed with a small transactions tax. This tax would make many speculative movements unprofitable and the financial system less volatile and sensitive, for instance, to daily political news and anticipation of economic policy changes. Consequently, it would create space for more autonomous economic policies of states and as a by-product also some revenues for the international community.
More recent advocates of the tax have tended to emphasise the importance of these revenues (for different accounts, see Deacon 1997: 209; Giddens 1998: 150-151) , which might yield up to USD1000 billion a year (estimates vary between USD75 billion and USD1 trillion, and they depend not only on the rate of taxation, but on the elasticity of the demand for currencies, on the transaction costs, on tax evasion etc.). Equally importantly, many others have pointed out that the power of global financial markets and the ability of the players in these markets to eschew taxation is a threat to democracy (Ramonet 1997 ).
Tobin's proposal was made explicitly in opposition to the mainstream of orthodox economics. Orthodox economic theory -rational expectations theory, and monetarism, both drawn from neoclassical economics -claim that the current state of affairs of free convertibility and floating exchange rates, which they strenuously advocated in the 1960's and early 1970's, is the best possible world. This notion is based on abstract theoretical reasoning. In fact, economics is best understood as a powerful, institutionalised language game, which revolves around sustaining the purity of the basic assumptions -and the consequent ideological implications. The orthodox assumptions are explicitly irrealist and instrumentalist, and they imply the denial of the existence of social beings and relations. (Cf. McCloskey 1986; and Lawson 1997) Moreover, they abstract away such crucial features of the real world as radical uncertainty in the face of openness and unpredictability of the future; or the fact that all economic demi-regularities (contingent, tendential "laws") depend upon unique, transitory, institutional arrangements.
It is therefore not surprising that the real-world historical processes have not supported the monetarist hypothesis that freely convertible and floating exchange rates will lead to global efficiency gains, enhanced stability and greater freedom of action for the states. Already before the latest turmoil, many concluded by mid-1990's that foreign exchange markets do not always function optimally. Quite to the contrary, "they are marked by exclusive, destabilising volatility" (Kaul, Grunberg & ul Haq 1996, 3) . And as the post-1997 series of crises has demonstrated, the real economy consequences of this volatility can be drastic for hundreds of millions of people all over the world: decline of real wages and income, unemployment, marginalisation, growing lack of access to social resources and possibilities, poverty, illness, and even hunger.
The Tobin tax is meant to curb the exponential growth of speculative over real and to counter some of these effects of the consequent volatility in the global financial markets. As an economist, Tobin was arguing mostly against monetarists and, more generally, believers in the neoclassical orthodox of "Pareto-optimal" laissez fairecapitalism. He was quite happily unaware of the to-be philosophical and sociological mystifications and reifications of globalisation. It is crucial to understand, however, that many philosophical and sociological mystifications of globalisation and postmodernisation (in many accounts, these are intimately related) would seem to justify the status quo as strongly as orthodox economics does.
Let me come back to Castells, as a very important example of these tendencies, not least because of his scholarly thoroughness and widely recognised position as an interpreter of the global situation. Castells (see 1996: 372) , echoing Jean Baudrillard's idea of a postmodern society bound up entirely in simulation, in which all sense of origin and real is lost in the play of endlessly replicating sign systems, claims that the "real economy" has become "unreal" and subordinated to the play and simulations of global financial market flows: (ibid.: 472) This is mystification in a sense that Castells represents the financial markets as almost deified forces, capable of making practices and relations "real" and "unreal". There is a thin line between innovating new metaphors and making exaggerated claims, and then mystifying and reifying social relations. All too easily, as in this passage of Castells, sociology becomes the mystic rite deciphering the meaning of the presumed quasi-deified forces, and consequently shying away from any attempt at empowering actors to influence them in any way.
However, there have been many studies describing and explaining both the re-emergence of the 1920's style global financial markets and the development of off-shores in terms of intentional human actions and their unintended consequences. These processes would not have happened without state actions -particularly by the US and the UK -and deregulatory measures, which opened the way, and sometimes explicitly encouraged, new financial innovations. Also the IMF and many central banks have played an important role in pressing for further financial market liberalisation. Once having become material, the financial markets themselves have constituted powerful identities and interests. (See, for instance, Helleiner 1996; Palan 1998) .
From this perspective, Tobin's idea seems to be much more emancipatory than what many of the recent accounts of globalisation, postmodernisation and development of a network society would allow for. Simply put, the Tobin tax is based on the assumption that the emergent "space of global flows" is a product of human actions and can be transformed to fit better with morally, economically and politically desirable aims, as judged within a democratic dialogue. Just recall Horkheimer's [1991 Horkheimer's [ /1937 classic distinction between traditional and critical theory: critical theory stems from an understanding that empirically observable facts are products of social history and that they belong, actually or potentially, to the sphere of human influence; and thereby, they loose their objectivity. Similarly, the Tobin tax can be said to constitute emancipation in the sense of "the transition from an unwanted, unnecessary and oppressive situation to a wanted and/or needed and empowering or more flourishing situation" (Bhaskar 1994: 253) .
It must be, again, underlined that this emancipation via the establishment of a Tobin tax regime promises to transcend the dichotomy between state sovereignty and globalisation. States will be empowered to act differently, yet a new global political problematique is opened. This kind of emancipation also follows Derrida's (1992: 37) suggestion, made in a different context, that "it can even happen, and one can cautiously hope for, that in certain cases the old state structures help us fight against private and transnational empires"; and his remark that "is it not necessary to have the courage and lucidity for a new critique of the new effects of capital?" (ibid.: 57). I take this new critique to imply new global responsibilities and institutional arrangements.
Global taxation: towards new politics of globalisation?
Let us have a somewhat closer look at the problem of state sovereignty in this context. Would sovereign states -or more deeply, the institution of state sovereignty -allow for the development of an international and global system of taxation? The developments of capitalist money economy, modern bureaucracy and sovereign nation-states enabled modern forms of taxation. (See Weber 1978 /1922 . In the Europe of the 17 th and 18 th century, taxation became fiscal in the proper sense of the term, for a recognised public domain of finance and expenditure emerged. Moreover, a separate and autonomous field of economy -supposedly following its own laws -was constructed, and constituted by private ownership. Naturally, taxation was the way to underwrite the state's expenses by drawing revenues from the field of economy. However, as Giddens correctly observes, with modernisation, (Giddens 1985: 157) There are in fact three noteworthy developments here. Firstly, since state sovereignty was taken to imply exclusive control (analogical to ownership) over a territory, modern states have also come to assume monopoly over taxation within their territory. The US government cannot impose a tax on the Japanese, European or even Nicaraguan individuals or firms, however much it would like to, unless they operate within its territory. Secondly, the de facto revenues of the states have been dependent on taxation, and we may assume that they are jealously guarding their rights in this regard. Finally, taxation has been associated with the governance of society, for it has been used to achieving moral and socio-political purposes. Since the development of parliamentarism (late 17 th century) and the advent of the notion of people's sovereignty (late 18 th century), more democratic procedures for determining these purposes have been established. Finally, the 20 th century welfare state emerged with new ways of spending the revenues on social, egalitarian and democratic purposes.
Taxation is thus a deeply political issue, which cuts across a number of issues: state sovereignty, surveillance, governance and democracy. Is this a problem for the Tobin tax? At the outset, a currency transactions tax appears to be global, and it also creates global revenues, likely to be used for global purposes. Yet, states continue to be sovereign, having, at least in principle, exclusive control over defining their own purposes, and setting the level, means and targets of taxation therein. Is there not a contradiction here?
A modern sovereign is the legal system that defines all the competencies and rules for changing or creating rules; it empowers and constrains. Now, if state A creates, by legislative acts, an offshore for banks and firms based in countries other than A, run by non-A-citizens, it empowers banks and firms by providing them with new opportunities, and constrains other states by making them loose some of their controlsin the form of regulation and taxation -over those firms. At some point, we may argue, quantity turns into quality, and at some point the offshore spaces and the global financial markets in combination with all kinds of new financial instruments start to appear as sovereign entities, instead of states -at least for most states. Relations of domination between states still remain as an aspect of these complex realities; witnessed by the relative power of the US in most contexts of multilateral arrangements.
Latham describes how the re-emergence of the global financial markets and the innovation of new financial instruments (derivatives in particular) in the currency markets opened up a new form of agency for banks and corporations: […] […] . (Latham, forthcoming) Globalisation, not least the globalisation of financial markets, have thus created and empowered new actors and given rise to new structures. At some level, this point is not that different from the view of Castells, but there is no mystification here. For Latham and many others, these new social structures -originally created by some states -appear to be as sovereign and exclusive as states, but non-territorial. These structures are "sovereign" in a sense that they empower actors to operate in autonomous spaces that they have constituted; yet the consequences of these actions forcefully condition actors outside this sphere, not least states. For instance, "in today's world of high capital mobility, even the minor exercise of political autonomy can produce major exchange market pressures" (Eichengreen, Tobin & Wyplosz 1995: 162) . Thus, often governments of sovereign states seem to be more forcefully and immediately accountable to markets than to their parliaments. Where is sovereignty?
Now, the best way for most states in most contexts -and to many other political actors as well -to regain control over these forces is to organise collective actions globally. The Tobin tax regime represents an attempt at such a collective action. That is, the argument is that in order to defend and develop their autonomy vis-à-vis the global financial markets, which seem to have assumed new forms of agency, autonomy and control also over actors external to their own sphere and logic, the states must initiate new collective, global arrangements.
From this angle, the Tobin tax can also be read as an attempt to resurrect aspects of the sovereign power of the state. As we remember, one of the aims of Tobin's original proposal was indeed to create more space for the autonomy of the nation-state (for their economic policies). It may turn out that the increase in autonomy might in practice turn out to be only modest, depending on the circumstances. In normal conditions, it would create more space against the volatility based on political news etc. But the Tobin tax alone cannot give any guarantees against such crisis as those of 1992-93, 1994-95, and 1997-99, although it can prevent the build up of these crises (see Kaul, Grunberg & ul Haq op.cit.: 6 ). Yet it seems that in the politics of globalisation the Tobin tax regime is, first and foremost, on the side of the sovereign states.
Moreover, the collection of the tax would be carried out at the booking site, on a national basis, and only national authorities can do this. Furthermore, since the implementation of the tax must be resulting from an international agreement, "participating can be a decision of only sovereign governments" (ibid.: 9). Although an international body is needed to set the rate of taxation, define taxable transactions, determine exemptions from the tax and undertake monitoring and auditing tasks, as well as collect the revenues from national authorities, the ultimate control and practical implementation would still be at the hands of governments. Also the states would get a share of the revenues. Without collaboration, they would not be able to tax these flows at all.
Parts of this story sound familiar. Although the rules, principles and decisions of international regimes are in practice quite conclusive, it is typically presumed that at least in the last instance, states remain sovereign, thus free to do what they want. Of course, they are free to try to act otherwise, but they have to bear the consequences. Some of the constraints are direct and intentional. Systems of regional and global governance do back up their rules and principles with sanctions. Beside the direct, violence-and security-oriented methods of power (crisis management with the help of armed forces, power-balancing policies, alliance-formation, great power management of collective security etc.), a variety of more sophisticated methods based on surveillance have emerged, data-collection, and supervision. The aim of these methods is always to influence the strategic calculations and cost-benefit-analyses of states by making them visible from a certain perspective.
There are also so called decentralised sanctions, resulting from non-centralised sanctions by few or many, that are about the legitimacy of states. One has to live in accordance with the established rules, norms and practices in order to preserve the highly valued relations. Repeated violations of the rules can lead to tit-for-tat reactions, delegitimation and, eventually, to exclusion, either contextually or globally. (For a more complete analysis of these power relations, see Patomäki forthcoming).
Finally economic globalisation, and the emergence of offshores, non-territorial spaces, and the increased mobility of banks and firms, have evoked fears about the reactions of economic actors in response to any attempt at acting differently from the standard: neoliberalisation. These fears may sometimes be grossly exaggerated, yet many states have faced powerful constraints against spontaneous actions. (For a well-known articulation of some of these constraints, see Gill & Law 1993) .
It is idealism, in the standard pejorative sense of the term, to deny the reality of power relations in the world, and to continue to represent state sovereignty as something actually existing and, in most instances, de facto, and always de jure inviolable; or as the exclusive, universal normative ideal all should aspire for, no matter what. In fact, it has always been idealism to represent state sovereignty in this way: it has been a contradictory and counterfactual ideal rather than a blunt description of political realities. Globalisation -in the context of many cultural changes -has made this more obvious and visible (for different accounts, see Held 1995: 73-140; Walker 1993) .
So what exactly is our claim here? State sovereignty has always been an idealisation, but globalisation has both eroded some of the capabilities of the 20 th century nation-states and made this idealisation more visible also through new concepts, frameworks and visions. Yet, the autonomy of sovereign states can and should be defended against the global financial markets. But this is not the end of the story. Although the autonomy of economic policies of states is an important goal, and although sovereign states should also be defended and developed otherwise, complementary political responses to globalisation are needed, too. From this perspective, we can fully recognise that the Tobin tax regime -as the first global tax regime -would also have deep political implications vis-à-vis authority, surveillance, governance and democracy.
Note also that the Tobin tax regime would not be that different from some of the existing and planned institutional arrangements. Like the IMF and the WTO now, or the planned Multilateral Agreement for Investments, MAI, the body that implements and looks after the Tobin tax will be empowered with surveillance capabilities and sanctions. It is different only on two accounts: it would be the first global tax ever, and the revenues are huge compared to the resources of existing international organisations (the UN basic budget is less than USD3 billion a year, and even the biggest ever IMF rescue packages are only USD50 billion). The revenues of the Tobin tax can be used for social purposes that must be determined globally. Moreover, in itself, the tax constitutes a form of social control and regulation. It thereby revives also the problems of authority, justice and democracy in a new, global context.
The Tobin tax and global democratisation
The global financial markets have become an established, powerful structure. The Tobin tax may well be the corresponding activity that will make that structure vulnerable to collective conflict and deliberate revision. In fact, here we have a dual problem of emancipatory democratisation: first concerns the process of making the Tobin tax real, the second concerns the outcome of this process, namely the Tobin tax regime and its institutional arrangements.
The proposal for a currency transactions tax is not new: it was proposed already a quarter of a century ago. The major problem has always been the lack of realistic political possibilities. At the outset, it was rejected by economists, and very little of it was heard in the world outside that restricted sphere. But gradually it has become a politically more serious proposal, endorsed more and more widely, in spite of the continuous and persevering opposition by those having accepted the reasoning of orthodox economists. However, Tobin and most of his followers have assumed that all major financial centres and, indeed, most states have to consent with the idea before it is workable. That is, the US and the UK in particular would have a de facto veto right over it. It also seems that they are willing to use that right also in this case. Hence, the proposal does not seem to be very realistic.
"The Tobin Tax: How to Make it Real" (Patomäki 1999a ) is a proposal to overcome this problem. The proposal is at times technical, but its political implications are -and are also meant to be -emancipatory. According to this model, the Tobin tax regime can be realised in two phases, and any grouping of countries can start it at any time.
(1) In its first phase, the system would consist of the euro-EU, the Euroland, and a group of other countries, or, alternatively, any bigger group of other countries, without the EU. However constituted, this grouping should establish an open agreement -any state can join at any time -and a supranational body orchestrating the tax and collecting the revenues of a small underlying transactions tax (10 basis points, at most); much bigger exchange surcharge (1%-3% or even more); and a relatively high tax, perhaps 1%, on domestic-currency lending to non-residents (only to non-residents who are not yet within the tax regime). This arrangement would solve the tax evasion problem and is economically sound.
(2) In the second phase, which should be carried out either when all major financial centres and most other countries have joined the first phase system, or at latest by, say, year 2010, a universal and uniform Tobin tax at a higher -yet absolutely low -1% rate would be applied.
This arrangement is politically more realistic than any previous proposal. It would make it possible for a(ny) grouping of countries to proceed quickly without the consent of every state (including such financial centres as London/UK or New York/US), yet it would not compromise the aim of a universal and uniform tax. Moreover, it is devised in such a manner that it would build up pressure for the outsiders to join. In other words, since this model empowers actors to work for the Tobin also without the support of the US, the UK, the IMF etc., it is radically emancipatory in its implications.
The second ethico-political problematic concerns the outcome of the process of establishing the tax regime. Very few have given any serious consideration on this matter. A global tax regime with sanctions and surveillance systems and potential for huge revenues raises the whole problematic of political theory in the global context: what are the principles of legitimation of collective organisations? How should they be assessed in terms of material benefits and their distribution, rightful authority, justice and democracy?
Tobin and many of his followers have assumed that the tasks of orchestrating the tax should be given to the IMF; it would also have a role in allocating the revenues, even if it is not, in principle, necessary that it should get any of the revenues for its own purposes. For Tobin, there were tactical reasons for this assumption (he thought that a universal tax could be imposed via the IMF), but for the representatives of the Washington consensus, this is likely to be the preferred solution both for ideological and egoist, power-political reasons (i.e. no international or global democratisation). In "The Tobin Tax: How to Make it Real" we make an argument for not giving the IMF -or the World Bank -this role, and for not subordinating the proposed Tobin Tax Organisation to the Bretton Woods institutions.
In short: 1. The two-phase scheme of establishing the Tobin tax regime makes the rationale for Tobin's original proposal disappear (furthermore, the first-phase non-universal tax regime is incompatible with the IMF structure); 2. The Bretton Woods institutions have no specific expertise in international taxation (in fact, they have typically opposed the idea); 3. The economic policies that the IMF has imposed upon countries have contributed to the recent economic crises, and, for the time being, the IMF seems to lack legitimacy for governing the Tobin tax (as acknowledged also by the G7 governments); 4. The fact that the principles of governance of the IMF are by no means democratic contributes to these legitimation problems; and 5. There is a more general and permanent need to pluralise governance structures and open up new democratic possibilities in global governance.
It is precisely the two-phases model that enables the interested states to take the initiative also in devising the TTO -without the consent of all economic "great powers". In the first phase of establishing the Tobin tax regime, a new supranational body orchestrating the tax must be founded. Let us call it the Tobin tax organisation, TTO. The TTO should be independent from any existing organisational structure. Given that it will also have a role in collecting and allocating the revenues, the question is: how can we guarantee fair democratic representation in its agenda-setting and decision-making and establish the possibility of accountable, transparent and just outcomes of its proceedings? It is possible to combine state-representation with parliamentary and civil society representation. Moreover, the TTO should follow more thoroughly democratic principles than any of the existing international or regional organisations (including the EU), by making the Council of Ministers follow qualified decision-making (with secret ballots) and by empowering the representative and participatory pillar of the system with real powers (motions, veto-rights, budgetary rights etc). This system also eschews some of the exclusionary tendencies of the model of cosmopolitan democracy developed by Held (op.cit.): it does not exclude non-democratic states (from the organisation and its Council of Ministers), but retains the right of parliamentary representation to democratic parliaments, and checks the spontaneity of the civil society actors by a combination of a screening process and lottery (i.e. this model is following some ancient Greek methods in an entirely different context).
When the time for the transition to the second phase approaches, the fate of the TTO has to be decided. Should it remain independent or rather merged with more general systems of governance? We argue that the United Nations has a lot of potential in this regard. But it has to be reformed first. To facilitate these reforms -which should both empower and democratise the UN system, and also prepare it for the second phase of the Tobin tax regime -it is suggested that the TTO should allocate a share of its revenues to the UN system. Regarding the substance of the UN reforms, we discuss the proposal of the Commission on Global Governance to establish an economic Security Council; and that of the South Centre to reconstruct the Economic and Social Council, of the UN. Either one could take over the TTO in the second phase. But it is also possible that the UN will turn out to be unreformable, and even that the TTO itself will become, step by step, the pivotal nodal point in the global systems of governance.
Concluding remarks
Automatic justification of laissez faire liberalism/capitalism and mystification and reification of the processes of globalisation often go hand in hand, although the latter may add, among other things, irony and scepticism to the former. Actors can be misinformed and misled in different ways. Whatever the variation, the result is always the same: tacit acceptance of the existing relations of domination and other constraints and absences, which are co-causing the unwanted and undesired situation that prohibit further flourishing of human possibilities.
But the 'there-is-no-alternative' frame is widespread also among those opposing global laissez-faire capitalism. In particular, for many defenders of state sovereignty these two tendencies of liberal-capitalist economics and mystifying accounts of globalisation are necessarily connected, and therefore they think that to oppose laissez faire liberalism/capitalism must mean to oppose also globalisation.
The beauty of the Tobin tax is in its potential to give rise to new political constellations. It is both for the autonomy of states and for new global institutional arrangements. The argument is that the best way for states to gain some real autonomy is to collaborate and create new collective forms of organisation. However, these new institutional arrangements would not hinder processes of globalisation but would rather politicise and democratise them.
In the irreversible historical processes of structuration, the new phase of globalisation would inevitably lead to new kinds of political sagas, too. The Tobin tax organisation may well play a crucial role in some of these episodes -at least in the beginning.
Indeed, the time is ripe for an open-ended, contingent global political history to begin.
